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Abstract Radio Frequency Identification systems are in the limelight for a few
years and become pervasive in our daily lives. These smart devices are
nowadays embedded in the consumer items and may come soon into our
banknotes. At Financial Cryptography 2003, Juels and Pappu proposed
a practical cryptographic banknote protection scheme based on both
Optical and Radio Frequency Identification systems. We demonstrate
however that it severely compromises the privacy of the banknotes’ bear-
ers. We describe some threats and show that, due to the misuse of the
secure integration method of Fujisaki and Okamoto, an attacker can
access and modify the data stored in the smart device without optical
access to the banknote. We prove also that despite what the authors
claimed, an attacker can track the banknotes by using the access-key as
a marker, circumventing the randomized encryption scheme that aims
at thwarting such attacks.
Keywords: RFID, Privacy, Banknote Protection.
1 Introduction
The main goal of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems is to
identify objects in an environment by embedding tags onto these objects.
A tag is a tiny device capable of transmitting, over a short distance, a
unique serial number and other additional data. For instance, goods in
stores can be tagged in order to prevent shoplifting, or to speed up the
goods registration process by using wireless scanning instead of human
or optical scanning. The security issues of such systems are therefore
two-fold. On one hand, it must be impossible to thwart the system by
modifying the tag’s data or even creating fake tags; on the other hand,
tags should not compromise the bearers’ privacy.
It is vital to ensure the security of RFID systems, since many organiza-
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tions have already turned to use such devices for many large-scale appli-
cations. In particular, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to use
some RFIDs to protect Euro banknotes [13]. Although Euro banknotes
already include physical security features, ECB believes that RFIDs will
add further protection: electronic tags will give governments and law en-
forcement agency the means to track banknotes in illegal transactions.
We do not know yet if such chips will be embedded into all Euro ban-
knotes, or just those of a high denomination. Japanese government also
plans to embed RFIDs into new 10’000 Yen notes [9]. Though these ex-
amples may be just rumors until now, we can consider that such devices
will be used for such applications soon. Up to now, RFIDs are already
used in less sensitive applications. For instance, the tire manufacturer
Michelin decided to implant RFID tags inside the rubber sidewall of its
tires. These tags contain the tire’s unique ID and maybe some other data
such as origin, maximum inflation pressure, size, etc. The data stored
in these tags are readable by a receiver positioned up to 30 inches away
from the tire. These tags could pinpoint, for example, tires belonging to
a defective batch. The purpose currently is to identify and track tires,
but it could be adapted to allow tags to communicate directly with the
vehicle’s dashboard to indicate if the tires are properly inflated, over-
heated, overloaded, or if the tire tread is seriously worn [7]. Michelin
Tires’ RFID system is currently being tested in some taxis and rental
cars, but it could be extended to all Michelin Tires after 2005.
When technology advances, research on the privacy and security aspects
of such devices lags far behind. Security flaws could however result in
large-scale consequences from a sociological and economic point of view,
by flooding the market with fake-tagged items. By proposing the first
cryptanalysis of a scheme specially designed for RFID systems, we show
that, up to now, such systems can not be used in practical applications
without endangering the users’ privacy.
In this paper, we first describe the main characteristics of the RFIDs and
present in Section 3 the Juels – Pappu banknote protection scheme [8],
which uses RFIDs. We then describe in Section 4 some potential threats
to this scheme and show that, due to the misuse of the secure integration
method of Fujisaki and Okamoto, an attacker can access and modify the
data stored in the smart device without optical access to the banknote.
We also prove that despite the claims of the authors, an attacker can
track the banknotes by using the access-key as a marker, circumventing
the randomized encryption scheme that aims to thwart such attacks.
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2 Radio Frequency Identification Systems
In this section, we describe the technical aspects of RFID systems,
which consist of three elements:
The RFID tag (transponder) that carries the identifying data;
The RFID readers (transceivers) that read and write the tags’ data.
The back-end database, connected to the readers, that records
information related to the tags data.
While tags are low-capability devices, as explained below, readers and
back-end database have powerful capability of storage, computation and
communication. Therefore readers and back-end database can commu-
nicate through a secure channel.
2.1 Tags
In order to use RFID tags in large-scale applications, the per-unit cost
of such devices should be very low. Currently, the cost of such devices
is a few tens US cents [12] and would further drop to 5 US cents [10].
On the other hand, practical applications require that the tag size be
as tiny as a few millimeters square. Cost and size requirements mean
that power consumption, processing time, storage and logical gates are
extremely limited. From a technical point of view, a tag consists of an
antenna and a microchip capable of storing data and performing logical
operations such as bit-string comparisons of keys. One can distinguish
active tags which have a battery to run the microchip’s circuit and to
broadcast a signal to the reader, from passive tags which have no battery.
Active tags are suitable to track high cost items over long ranges but
they are too expensive to be embedded into banknotes. Only passive
tags are suitable for this application. Tags memory is small and can
store only a few hundreds bits in the best case [4]. Tags contain a few
thousands gates, which is below the threshold of embeding cryptographic
algorithms. For instance AES typically requires about 20,000 gates and
SHA-1 requires about 15,000 gates. From a security point of view, tags
can not be considered as tamper-resistant: all physical threats, such
as laser etching, ion-probes, clock glitching, etc. [12] are applicable to
recover the data stored in the tag. Therefore the tag cannot securely
store secret keys in the long term, for instance.
2.2 Communication
As will be explained in Section 2.3, the reader can transmit various
commands to the tag. In order to do this, the reader broadcasts Radio
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Frequency radiation as long as necessary to bring sufficient power to the
tag. The tag modulates the incoming radiation with its stored data. We
actually consider two channels: the forward channel from the reader to
the tag which can operate over long distance and the backward channel
from the tag to the reader which can operate over a shorter distance.
Both channels can be eavesdropped by an attacker since it is obviously
impossible to use cryptographic features.
2.3 Interface
We give below the common commands that are available on a tag:
read: allows every reader to obtain the data stored in the tag
memory.
write: allows every reader to write data in the tag memory.
Some other commands can be available on a tag:
sleep: this command is keyed so that the reader has to send a key
in order to put the tag into the sleep state. Then the tag does not
respond to the reader’s queries until it receives the wake command
with the legitimate key.
wake: after this command, the tag starts afresh to respond to
the reader. It is a keyed command associated with the sleep
command.
kill: this command destroys the tag definitively.
Moreover, Juels and Pappu [8] suppose that the following commands
are available:
keyed-read
keyed-write
These commands are similar to the read/write commands except that
they are keyed.
3 Juels – Pappu banknote protection scheme
3.1 Interested parties
Juels and Pappu proposed a banknote protection scheme whose goal is
to resist banknotes counterfeiting and track traffic flows by some law en-
forcement agency, nevertheless guaranteeing the privacy of the banknote
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handlers. First we describe all the interested parties who are involved
in the scheme.
Central bank. The central bank aims at creating banknotes and at
avoiding banknote forgery. It is therefore in its interest to have
unique banknote serial numbers and to protect the secret key,
which is used to sign the banknotes.
Law enforcement agency. The goal of this agency is to arrest forg-
ers. In order to achieve this, it needs to track banknotes and detect
fake ones easily, even in areas of dense traffic, such as airports.
Merchants. Merchants handle large quantities of banknotes. It
is conceivable that they will try to compromise their clients’ pri-
vacy. Merchants may comply with the law enforcement agency by
reporting irregularities in banknote data.
Consumers. Banknotes bearers want to protect their privacy. They
want therefore to limit banknotes tracking even if it means not re-
specting existing laws.
3.2 Concept and requirements
Up to now, banknote security solely relies on optical features, which
can be checked either by human-scanning or machine-scanning. In [8]
security relies on both optical and electronic features. Banknotes thus
have two data sources:
Optical: data can be encoded in a human-readable form and/or in
a machine-readable form such as a two-dimensional bar code. It
contains banknote serial number as well as denomination, origin,
etc.
Electronic: data can be read by wireless communication. Data are
signed by the central bank and encrypted with the law enforcement
agency public key and a random number.
Electronic data are stored in a RFID tag, which consists here of two cells
whose access is key-protected. The access-key can be (re-)generated from
the banknote optical data. One of the two cells, denoted γ, is univer-
sally readable but keyed-writable. The other cell, denoted δ, is both
keyed-readable and keyed-writable. In [8], the proposed scheme consists
in writing in γ the serial number of the banknote signed by the cen-
tral bank and encrypted with the law enforcement agency public key.
If this encrypted value was static, then an attacker could still track the
banknote using this value as a marker. To overcome this weakness, the
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signature on the serial number is re-encrypted by merchants as often as
possible, using obviously a probabilistic encryption scheme. Since the
signature is available from the optical data, encryption is performed from
scratch and does not need to be homomorphic. After the re-encryption
is performed, the new encrypted value is put into γ and the used random
value r is put into δ. Since γ and δ are keyed-writable, one must have
optical contact with the banknote to obtain the access-key and thereby
to re-encrypt the banknote. We will detail this procedure in Section 3.3.
We give below the requirements that [8] should guarantee.
Consumer privacy. Only the law enforcement agency is able to
track the banknotes using the RFID interface. Even the central
bank is not allowed to track banknotes.
Strong tracking. Law enforcement agency are able to identify a
banknote (by its serial number) even without optical contact.
Minimal infrastructure. In order to be user-friendly, the system
should not require that banknote bearers possess special equip-
ment. For their part, retail banks and shops should only buy de-
vices at reasonable cost. Furthermore, they should not be required
to set up a permanent network connection.
Forgery resistance. A forger has to have optical contact with a
banknote in order to create a fake one with the same serial number.
A forger should not be able to create a fake banknote with a new
serial number and moreover he should not be able to change the
banknote denomination.
Privilege separation. The data stored in the tag should only be
alterable given optical contact with banknotes.
Fraud detection. If the data stored by the tag are wrong, then a
merchant who has optical access to the banknote should be able
to detect the forgery.
In order to illustrate these requirements, Juels and Pappu give two ex-
amples of privacy attacks that a banknote protection system should
withstand. We give these two examples here because we will show, in
Section 4, that their scheme is actually not resistant to these attacks.
Example 1 “Bar X wishes to sell information about its patrons to local Merchant Y.
The bar requires patrons to have their drivers’ licenses scanned before they are admitted
(ostensibly to verify that they are of legal drinking age). At this time, their names, addresses,
and dates of birth are recorded. At the same time, Bar X scans the serial numbers of the
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RFID tags of banknotes carried by its patrons, thereby establishing a link between identities
and serial numbers. Merchant Y similarly records banknote serial numbers of customers
from RFID tags. Bar X sells to Merchant Y the address and birth-date data it has collected
over the past few days (over which period of time banknotes are likely not yet to have changed
hands). In cases where Bar X and Merchant Y hold common serial numbers, Merchant Y
can send mailings directly to customers indeed, even to those customers who merely enter or
pass by Merchant Y’s shops without buying anything. Merchant Y can even tailor mailings
according to the ages of targeted customers. Patrons of Bar X and Merchant Y might be
entirely unaware of the information harvesting described in this example.”
Example 2 “A private detective wishes to know whether Bob is conducting large-value
cash transactions at Carl’s store. She surreptitiously intercepts the serial numbers on ban-
knotes withdrawn by Bob and also records the serial numbers of those brought by Carl out of
his store. If there is any overlap between sets of numbers, she concludes that Bob has given
money to Carl. The private detective might reach the same conclusion if Bob leaves without
banknotes that he carried into Carl’s store. The private detective might also try to reduce
her risk of detection by reading the banknotes of Bob and Carl at separate times, e.g., en
route to or from the bank.”
3.3 Description of the method
We explain in this section the operations that should be performed
on the banknote. Let Sign(k,m) be the signature on a message m with
a key k and Enc(k,m, r) the encryption of m under the key k with the
random number r. We note || the concatenation of two bit-strings.
Setup. Central bank B and law enforcement agency L respectively own
a pair of public/private keys (PKB, SKB) and (PKL, SKL). PKB and
PKL are published as well as a collision-resistant hash function h.
Banknote creation. For every banknote i, B selects (according to its
own rules – which can be assumed to be public) a unique serial number
Si and computes its signature Σi = Sign(SKB, Si||deni) where deni is
the banknote denomination. B then computes an access-key Di such
that Di = h(Σi)1, prints Si and Σi on the banknote, and computes
Ci = Enc(PKL,Σi||Si, ri)
where ri is a random number. Ci is written into γ and ri is written into
δ. Note that the access-keys Di is not stored in the databases of B. In
order to keep in mind the values stored on/in the banknote, we give in
Tab. 1, established from [8], the content of the optical information as
well as those of cells γ and δ.
1Juels and Pappu point out that it is important that the hash function be applied on Σi
rather than on Si because an attacker who knows a serial number would be able to compute
the corresponding access-key without any optical contact with the banknote.
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RFID
Cell γ Cell δ
universally-readable / keyed-writable keyed-readable / keyed-writable
C = Enc(PKL,Σ||S, r) r
Optical
S Σ = Sign(SKB, S||den)
Table 1. Optical and RFID data
Banknote verification and anonymization. When a merchant M
receives a banknote, he verifies it then re-encrypts it according to the
following steps:
1 M reads the optical data Si and Σi and computes Di = h(Σi).
2 M reads Ci, stored in γ, and keyed-reads ri which is stored in δ.
3 M checks that Ci = Enc(PKL,Σi||Si, ri).
4 M chooses randomly r′i and keyed-writes it into δ.
5 M computes C ′i = Enc(PKL,Σi||Si, r′i) and keyed-writes it into γ.
If one of these steps fails then the merchant should warn the law en-
forcement agency.
Banknote tracking. Let us consider a target banknote that the law
enforcement agency L wants to check or track. L is able to easily obtain
the cipher C reading the cell γ and then to compute the plaintext Σ||S =
Dec(SKL, C). L can then check whether or not Σ is a valid signature.
If Σ is valid then L obtains the banknote serial number S.
3.4 Cryptographic algorithms
Encryption and signature schemes can be chosen among the existing
secure schemes. However they should bring security without involving
high overhead. Juels and Pappu suggest to use an El Gamal-based en-
cryption scheme [5] and the Boneh–Shacham–Lynn signature scheme [3],
both using elliptic curves. Let G denote an elliptic-curve-based group
with prime order q and let P be a generator of G. Let SKL = x ∈R Zq
be the law enforcement agency private key and PKL = Y = xP the
corresponding public key. A message m ∈ {0, 1}n where n is reasonable
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sized, is encrypted with the El Gamal scheme under the random number
r as follows:
Enc(PKL,m, r) = (m+ rY, rP ).
Since El Gamal encryption scheme is not secure against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks, Juels and Pappu suggest to use the secure integra-
tion method due to Fujisaki and Okamoto [6]; the message m is then
encrypted as follows:
Enc∗(PKL,m, r) = (Enc(PKL, r, h1(r||m)), h2(r)⊕m)
where h1 and h2 are two hash functions from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}n. As
explained in [8], signature size could be 154 bits. Assuming than a serial
number can be encoded over 40 bits, the plaintext Σ||S requires 194
bits. Let us consider a 195 bits order elliptic curve group, the size of
Enc∗(PKL,Σ||S, r) will be 585 bits. The total required size will then be
780 bits (585 bits in γ and 195 bits in δ). As pointed out in [8], current
RFID tags can provide such resources. For instance the Atmel TK5552
[4] offers a 1056 bits memory (only 992 bits are usable by the user). [11]
suggests that only RFID costing about 50 US cents could supply such a
capacity but less expensive tags with a few hundreds bits memory could
appear in a few years. RFID tags currently costing 5 US cents supply
less capacity, usually 64 or 96 bits of user memory [10].
4 Attacks on the banknote protection system
We introduce in this section several attacks that can be performed
on the Juels – Pappu banknote protection scheme. While some of these
attacks are proper to that scheme (Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.7), some other
are more general and could be applied to other RFID-based privacy
protection schemes (Sections 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6).
4.1 Pickpocketing attack
This attack that Juels and Pappu already mentioned is significant
enough to be recalled here. It requires an attacker to test a passer-by
in order to detect if he carries some banknotes. Even if the attacker is
not able to discover neither the serial number nor the denomination, he
is able to establish how many banknotes the passer-by is bearing.
The attacker has less information if banknotes of all denominations are
tagged than if only the largest ones are tagged. However, tagging ban-
knotes of all denominations may be dangerous with the Juels – Pappu
scheme due to the fact that scanning banknotes takes some time. Mer-
chants would not agree to re-encrypt notes of small denominations; pri-
vacy could consequently be threatened.
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Example 3 Some criminals want to steal some cars in a car park. Dur-
ing daylight hours, they only break into a few cars so as not to attract
attention. Their problem is therefore to determine which cars could be
the “best” ones, that is the cars that contain currency. Thanks to the
banknote protection system, they can radio-scan numerous cars in order
to pinpoint their targets.
These “pickpocketing” attacks show that the attack described in the
second example of Juels and Pappu (See page 39) still occurs even using
their banknote protection scheme.
4.2 Data recovery attack
The data recovery attack consists of two steps: the first one aims at
obtaining the access-key D and then the random number r which is
stored in the δ-cell; the second step exploits a misuse of the secure inte-
gration method of Fujisaki and Okamoto, in order to recover S and Σ.
So, the attacker can obtain the serial number of the banknote without
optical access to it. Note that even well-behaving merchants are not
supposed to obtain this information from the electronic data.
Step 1: One of the goals of the scheme is to avoid γ-write-access with-
out optical reading of the banknote. This implies that an attacker must
have physically access to the banknote to modify the γ-cell. However a
merchant who is willing to re-encrypt the banknote sends the access-key
D = h(Σ) (obtained by optical reading) to the tag in order to receive
the value stored in the δ-cell, i.e. the random number r. The attacker
can just eavesdrop the communication in order to steal D and then he
is able to communicate with the tag and finally obtain the δ-cell value
r. To buttress our argumentation, remind that it is usually easier to
eavesdrop the forward channel, that is from the reader to the tag, than
the backward channel. Note also that the communication range should
not be too short since one of the goals of the Juels – Pappu scheme is to
enforce banknotes tracking be the law enforcement agency, even in areas
of dense traffic, such as airports.
Step 2: The attacker first obtains the value stored in the γ-cell (uni-
versally readable). γ-cell contains:
Enc∗(PKL,m, r) = (Enc(PKL, r, h1(r||m)), h2(r)⊕m)
= (r + h1(r||m)PKL, h1(r||m)P, h2(r)⊕m)
Notation is defined in Section 3.4. Let us consider (²1, ²2, ²3) such that
(²1, ²2, ²3) = Enc∗(PKL,m, r).
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So:
²1 = r + h1(r||m)PKL, ²2 = h1(r||m)P , and ²3 = h2(r)⊕m.
She obtains therefore
m = ²3 ⊕ h2(r) where ²3, r, and h2 are known.
Since m := Σ||S, this proves that an attacker can discover the serial
number and the signature of a banknote without having optical access
to it, contrary to what Juels and Pappu claim.
The problem arises from the fact that the integration method of Fujisaki
and Okamoto is not secure anymore when the random value r is revealed.
Indeed, the purpose of the asymmetric encryption Enc(PKL, r, h1(r||m))
is to “hide” the random value that is used to generate the key of the
symmetric encryption. If this random value is public or can be determine
easily by an attacker, the integration method becomes null and void.
4.3 Ciphertext tracking
The protection method that we are discussing in this paper uses re-
encryptions to prevent tracking attacks. However, re-encryptions can
only be performed in practice by merchants or retail banks2. Therefore
the time period between two re-encryptions could last long enough to
track banknotes.
Example 4 Many supermarkets use massive computing power to an-
alyze the buying patterns of their clients. Identifying these patterns
enables merchants to reorganize their store layouts to increase their
sales. Data mining consists of using computer-based search techniques to
sort through the mounds of transaction data captured through goods bar-
coding. The frequently cited example is the “beer and diapers” example:
a large discount chain discovered by data mining its sales data that there
was a correlation between beer and diaper purchases during the evening
hours. The discount chain therefore moved the beer next to the diapers
and increased sales. Let us now consider a merchant who installs RFID
readers in his store departments: now he is able to analyze precisely his
client’s path and thereby to reorganize his store layout. Since some ex-
isting payment systems contain names and addresses, a client who stays
during a long time in the bicycle department without buying anything
will receive directly advertising literature to his door.
2We could imagine a scenario where citizens are able to re-encrypt their own banknotes, but
it is an unrealistic assumption.
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Ciphertext tracking attacks show that the threat described in the first
example of Juels and Pappu (See page 38) still occurs within their ban-
knote protection scheme. Let us first consider a milder version of the
attack: bar X cannot read the optical data on the banknotes of his
customers (We consider that a customer is a person who comes in the
shop; he does not necessarily need to buy anything). So, he stores in
a database all the γ-values that he is able to collect matched with the
name and address of their handlers. Merchant Y also reads the γ-values
of his clients and stores them. Bar X and merchant Y can combine their
databases: if a γ-value appears in both databases, they are almost sure
that it is the same client. Let us now consider a stronger attack: when
bar X returns change to a client, he re-encrypts banknotes with a fixed
number, denoted r0 also known by merchant Y. When a customer arrives
in Merchant Y’s store, the merchant reads the γ-value of the customer’s
banknotes (universally readable) and computes Σ0 using r0 (applying
the method described in Section 4.2). He then computes D0 = h(Σ0)
and tries to read δ with D0; if the tag agrees this means that r0 was
the appropriate random number and that merchant Y can be almost
sure that this client comes from Bar X. Note that Merchant does not
“touch” the banknote here: he has just to scan the people when they
pass through the store door for instance.
This issue is inherent in re-encryption-based privacy protection schemes:
since re-encryptions cannot be performed very frequently, it is possible
to track tags with their universally readable values (even if these values
seem to be some garbage for a person who is not authorized to decrypt
them). Note that even with a higher re-encryption frequency, the attack
still works if the re-encryptions are performed by the merchants, and
not by the users themselves.
4.4 Access-key tracking
The goal of the re-encryptions is to prevent banknotes tracking, as
we mentionned. If an attacker does not have optical contact with a
given banknote, then he should not be able to track it in the long-term.
Unfortunately, we demonstrate here that a side channel can be used to
track the banknotes. Indeed, if the attacker can see the banknote once
(or even, more simply, if he effects the first step of the attack described
in Section 4.2) then thanks to the static access-key D, he will be able to
track the banknote by just trying to read the δ-cell: the tag responds if
and only if the key D is the good one;
This attack is particularly devastating because it dashes the purpose of
the scheme. Actually, when a tag owns a unique access-key and responds
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if and only if the key sent by the reader is the valid one, this key can
be used to track the tag. On may think that the tag could thwart such
an attack by replying with some garbage when the access-key is wrong,
instead of remaining silent. Unfortunately, sending static garbage opens
a new way to perform tracking attacks, and requiring the tag to be able
to generate random garbage is not yet realistic due to the low capability
of such devices.
Example 5 Mrs Johnson suspects that her husband is having an affair
with his secretary. It seems that he has been giving her money. Mrs
Johnson decides to read the optical data on her husband’s banknotes -
in order to generate the access-key - and to surreptitiously follow his
secretary after work. She will soon know whether her suspicions are true
or not.
4.5 Cookies threat
According to [8], the sizes of the δ-cell and γ-cell are 195 bits and 585
bits respectively. Since these values can be modified for everyone having
access to the banknote (or using the attack described in Section 4.2), the
δ-cell and the γ-cell can be used to hide a certain amount of information.
This hidden information channel looks like an HTTP cookie. This cookie
will however be detected during the next re-encryption of the tag data
(since merchants have to check the current value before performing the
re-encryption) because δ and γ are not consistent anymore.
A clever way to abuse the tag is to put the cookie only in the δ-cell:
since the value r stored in this cell is a random number, it can be used
to store some information. Obviously, the γ-cell value will have to be
re-encrypted with the new random number. This kind of cookie will be
untraceable and will stay available until the next re-encryption.
4.6 Denial of service attack
We saw that when a merchant finds a discrepancy on a banknote,
he cannot accept the payment and should warn the law enforcement
agency. This could however be used to harm banknote bearers: all that
is required is to input incorrect data into either δ or γ. This could be
done not only by a merchant who has access to the optical data but also
anyone who is able to perform the first step of the attack described in
Section 4.2. Due to its simplicity, this malicious attack may bring about
many problems as the law enforcement agency as well as the Central
Bank – that has to restore the banknotes – would be flooded.
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Example 6 In a store, some hackers are waiting in line for the cash
register. The customer in front of them pays for his purchases. The
hackers eavesdrop the communication between the reader and the tag,
thus obtaining the access-key D; they then replace the data stored in
the cell γ with a false value, just for fun. The banknote becomes out
of service until it is restored by the Central Bank. They can block all
cashiers this way and take advantage of panic scenes between cashiers
and complaining customers in order to steal goods.
4.7 Sleeping and dead banknotes
We present here two attacks that are possible using the native com-
mands of the RFIDs. The first one exploits the sleep function of the
device, and the second uses the kill function.
Juels and Pappu point out that banknotes issued from dirty money could
pass, for instance, airport checking, by replacing Σ and S by values issued
from clean money. Another solution would be to put banknotes into the
sleep mode with the sleep function. After having passed through bank
policy checking, money launderers are able to “wake up” the banknotes.
It is therefore important that this function is not universally available.
However, if forgers create fake banknotes (by cloning) they will be able
to embed a sleep function in their tags: law enforcement agents conse-
quently cannot detect the counterfeit banknotes during checking.
We propose now a stronger denial of service attack than those proposed
in Section 4.6, involving the kill function of the tags. Obviously, this
function is a keyed command but the key may be too short to ensure
real security. According to the Auto-ID center’s standards, the kill-key
should be 24 bits [2] or even 8 bits [1] ! This means that it would be
so simple to perform an exhaustive search to destroy tags. Tag makers
should therefore embed longer kill-keys, but the longer the key, the more
expensive the tag.
5 Conclusion
We have outlined in this paper the main aspects of banknote protec-
tion and described the Juels - Pappu scheme, which is based on both
Optical and Radio Frequency Identification systems. We show that two
parties can benefit directly from the use of tags in the banknotes: the
central bank and the law enforcement agency, both profiting from this
system by enforcing banknote tracking and anti-counterfeiting. What
about the other interested parties such as merchants and citizens? The
role of merchants here is crucial since privacy relies only on their collab-
oration. Even if most of the merchants are compliant, one can notice
Privacy Issues in RFID Banknote Protection Schemes 47
that re-encrypting banknotes implies a loss of time for merchants. An-
other issue is the attitude of a merchant when faced with a problematic
banknote; according to [8], he should warn the law enforcement agency.
However he is able to repair the problematic data as he has optical ac-
cess to the banknote. Will he risk losing a customer by warning the
law enforcement agency? From the citizens point of view, it would be
difficult to tolerate such a system for three reasons. The first one is that
citizens have to travel to the central bank (or perhaps to a retail bank)
every time they have a faulty banknote. The second reason is that they
will lose confidence in their banknotes: they can no longer be sure that
they will be able to use their currency at the cash register! Last but not
least, they will be suspicious about the fact that their privacy and their
anonymity remain intact.
Beyond the sociological issues brought by this scheme, we proved that,
despite what the authors claimed, the proposed banknote protection
scheme suffers from some privacy issues and thus compromises the pri-
vacy of the banknotes’ bearers. We have described many attacks that
can be performed on the scheme and so, proved that the only RFID
banknote protection scheme published until now is null and void and
should not be used in practice. Even if this solution could be partially
fixed, some attacks are inherent in re-encryption-based privacy protec-
tion schemes, as explained in Section 4.3, what strengthens our feeling
in the fact that such an approach is not suitable to privacy protection
schemes. Furthermore, some described attacks are beyond the scope of
the banknote protection, as the access-key tracking attack, and we think
that our contribution should be taken into account in future designs of
RFID privacy protection schemes.
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